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The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights-A Problem of
Judicial Method
I.

INTRODUCTION

An obvious function of the Bill of Rights is to provide a
mechanism for achieving a balance between the individual and the
state; the specific restraints contained therein reflect the boundary
between the individual and the federal government as envisioned by the
drafters. The balance produced was intended to be organic; that is, to
be forever adaptable to the changing needs of government and people.
Of the two methods for changing the boundary, amendment and
judicial construction, the latter has assumed prime importance because
the former has proved to be practically unwieldy. The exact location
of the boundary line and the resulting responsiveness of the balance to
human needs depend in large part upon the judicial and political
philosophies and consequent judicial methodologies current within the
Supreme Court.
The overriding constitutional issue of our time has been the
controversy between those who view the Bill of Rights as an absolute
mandate empowering, the Supreme Court to grant or deny
constitutional protection to basic human values depending entirely
upon whether they have literal support within the constitutional text,
and those who view the Bill of Rights as a general expression of
constitutional tenets to be balanced along with other factors such as
human needs, legislative needs, and each individual Justice's
understanding of basic standards of fairness and justice. The context
for this controversy has been the Court's adjudication of the
implications of due process "liberty" and the extent to which the first
eight amendments should give it procedural and substantive content.
The Court has seldom looked beyond the Bill of Rights to
nonconstitutional sources from which interests fundamental to due
process "liberty" can be derived.' On occasion, certain Supreme Court
Justices have looked to such sources, and opponents have decried such
action as an abuse of judicial restraint. 2
Since the Constitution is a plan of written but flexible basic rights,
interpreted and applied by a judiciary with few limitations upon its
powers, it is necessary to avoid conferring carte blanche discretion
1. See generally E.

CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT

10-67 (1948); Corwin, The

"Higher Law" Background ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1929).
2. Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HuGo BLACK AND THE
SuPREME COURT 133 (S.
Strickland ed. 1967).
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upon the Court. This Note adopts the premises that we may be arriving
at an era when "liberty" will demand constitutional protection of
human interests other than those explicitly embodied within the text of
the Bill of Rights; that judicial identification of those interests is often
the most effective 'method for granting this protection; and that the
function of constitutional due process is to preserve the relevancy of
"liberty" to the needs of modern people. This Note will explore the
Supreme Court's past attempts to bring content to due process
"liberty," and will illustrate the difficulties in granting constitutional
status to a nonconstitutional interest by tracing the legal development
of one such interest, privacy. Finally, the Note will argue for a judicial
methodology through which fundamental nonconstitutional interests
might gain constitutional status.
II.

DUE PROCESS "LIBERTY"

A.

AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Introduction

Due process adjudication involves the judiciary in a three-step
process that leads to eventual reconciliation of the conflicting demands
of private and public interests First, the court must identify
conceptually the asserted interest as one which is fundamental to our
society. Secondly, the government-imposed- regulation or procedure
must be found to embody some legitimate public concern and some
proper method of protecting that concern. Finally, a factual judgment
is required to determine the actual effect that the regulation or
procedure has upon individual liberties.' This Note is concerned
primarily with the first step, the identification of fundamentality; that
is, what is inherent in "dueness" of process.
The original significance of due process, as traced from the Magna
Carta, was that a person should be accorded the "procedures of law"
when being deprived of his life, liberty, or property. 5 Thus, when
adopted into our constitutional structure, the concept of due process
had only procedural connotations. The notion that due process could
be used in limiting legislative power in order to protect substantive
3. The quantum of individual freedom varies with the variety of human demands made
upon society to make greater affirmative provision for the well-being of the whole. Professor
Pound has observed that "men wish to be free but they want much besides." R. POUND, JUSTICE
ACCORDING TO LAW 31 (1951).
4. See generally Hastie, Judicial Method in Due Process Inquiry, in GOVERNMENT UNDER
LAW 331 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956).
5. See Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development,
17 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1917).
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rights was therefore slow in developing.6 Not until the Dred Scott case
in 18577 was a substantive interpretation and application of due process
conceived by the Supreme Court, and then only in dictum.
B. ProceduralDue Process
Since the Bill of Rights contains primarily procedural limitations,
the Court has often given procedural content to due process "liberty."
During the past 50 years the Court has generally debated the
fundamentality of interests specifically recognized by the text of the
first eight amendments; however, certain opinions during this period
are significant for their enunciations of various judicial methodologies
that are still current within the Court.
In a 1937 case, Palko v. Connecticut,8 an appellant argued that
the double jeopardy prohibition of the Bill of Rights was essential to
due process and therefore applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court,
stated that it was not the presence of Bill of Rights limitations within
the specifics of the Constitution that made them equally valid as
against the states; rather, those limitations had been found to be
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 9 "To abolish them," he
continued, would be "to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' "10 He conceptualized fundamental rights that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" as those interests which are
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions."'" He found that the immunity
from double jeopardy was not such a "fundamental principle."
Implicit in this standard of "ordered liberty" is the view that an
asserted private interest, which has no corollary within the specifics of
the first eight amendments, but which fits the test outlined by Mr.
Justice Cardozo, might well be deemed "fundamental."
In a 1947 case, Adamson v. California,2 the privilege against selfincrimination was held not to be a fundamental right protected by due
process "liberty" against state infringement. This result was not
6. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856), may have been the first clear judicial
expression of a substantive right interpretation of due process.
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
8. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
9. Id. at 325.
10. Id.
11.Id. at 328.
12. 332 U.S.46 (1947).
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surprising in view of an earlier decision, Twining v. New Jersey.13
However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion and Mr.
Justice Black's dissenting opinion joined the basic controversy which
is at the heart of this Note: By what method should due process
"liberty" be given procedural and substantive content?
In substance, Justice Frankfurter adopted Justice Cardozo's view
in Palko that due process "liberty" should perform an independent
function apart from the Bill of Rights by providing the judiciary with
the means to prevent governmental abuses not manifest when the Bill
of Rights was drafted. As the objective standard to guide the Court in
its applications of this flexible due process, Justice Frankfurter adopted
the "ordered liberty" concept, which he took to encompass certain
values of decency and fairness to be used as limitations upon judicial
discretion.' 4
Justice Black countered with the argument that an "ordered
liberty," flexible due process method exceeds the constitutuional
powers of the Court. 5 He based this contention on the premise that the
Constitution contains a relatively fixed balance between public and
private interests and, therefore, the Court is obliged to invalidate
legislation only on the strength of the particularized standards
enumerated in the Bill of Rights."6 Justice Black, a libertarian, was
seeking wholesale incorporation of all of the Bill of Rights guarantees
into due process "liberty," and he feared that a flexible due process
method would grant the Court a large measure of discretion to deny
the fundamentality of these guarantees. 7 This approach has been
termed an "absolutist method"; that is, a preference for a
methodology of judging which denies to judges the power to weigh
competing values and policies and which adopts the Bill of Rights as
the sole standard of fundamentality.'8
In Rochin v. California," all of the participating Justices agreed
that the method by which the state had obtained incriminating evidence
was a denial of the defendant's right to due process. Justice
13. 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (a state can constitutionally compel a man to testify against himself
in spite of the fifth amendment prohibition against such action by the federal government).
14. 332 U.S. at 63 (concurring opinion).
15. 332 U.S. at 90 (dissenting opinion).
16. Id.
17. See Reich, supra note 2. See also Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function,
14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 467 (1967); Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv.549 (1962).
18. See generally Freund, supra note 17.
19. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, avoided implicating the Bill of
Rights, by concluding that "this is conduct that shocks the conscience"
and offends a "sense of justice. ' 20 Justice Black, reiterating his
Adamson opinion, preferred to rest invalidation of this procedure on

self-incrimination values reflected by the fifth amendment. 2 1 Since
Adamson, the Court has found most of the major Bill of Rights
' 22
provisions to be "fundamental" to due process "liberty.

Significantly, however, a majority of the Court has not held to Justice
Black's view that judicial authority to identify fundamental rights in
the first eight amendments negatives judicial authority to derive
fundamental due process guarantees from other sources.
C. Substantive Due Process
The earliest attempts by the Court to give substantive content to

due process "liberty" centered on the protection of commercial and
property rights, termed "economic due process." Significantly, the
Court had little difficulty in identifying "liberty of contract" as
fundamental to "liberty," even though it was not expressly recognized
by the Bill of Rights as a limitation upon government.24 The Court,
however, did not find the contract liberty so fundamental as to be
20. Id. at 172, 173 (conviction based on the admission into evidence of 2 morphine tablets
forcibly retrieved by police through use of a stomach pump from stomach of suspected narcoticspeddler).
21. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (invalidating a state
regulation arbitrarily restricting admission to the bar); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
(invalidating a state statute subjecting public employees to arbitrary dismissal). In both instances
the Court relied solely on due process grounds without reference to the standards of the Bill of
Rights.
22. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment jury trial); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment confrontation of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination privilege); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth
amendment right to counsel in non-capital cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion
of evidence obtained by fourth amendment unreasonable search and seizure).
23. The first such case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), struck down state
legislation which sought to regulate foreign insurance companies doing business within the state.
For other cases invalidating economic or social welfare legislation under a substantive due process
theory, see Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Ribnik v.
McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
24. In identifying the "liberty of contract" as being fundamental, the Court stated: "The
liberty mentioned in that amendment (the fourteenth) means not only the right of the citizen to
be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed
to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties . . . " Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
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absolute. Rather, it determined that in any given instance regulatory
measures might be exercised legitimately, and therefore it adopted a
case-by-case, ad hoc method of adjudication. The Court subsequently
utilized this methodology to invalidate a number of state and federal
economic and social welfare programs.2
This approach was challenged in the early 1900's by a group of
dissenters led by Mr. Justice Holmes, 6 and the Court eventually
discarded due process protection of economic libertiesY This demise
did not result from any explicit recognition by the Court that social
welfare legislation was an inherent good; rather, the specific reason
given centered on the problem of conceptual identification of the
constitutional fundamentality of each asserted economic interest.2
With no clear constitutional text to provide a "standard of
fundamentality," the Court reasoned that decisions as to "debatable
issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs"2 9 should be
left to legislative judgment. Thus, it was a conceived lack of standards
for substantive due process adjudication that induced the Court to
repudiate economic liberties.
Some years prior to the demise of economic due process, the
Court, in several decisions, gave substantive content to due process
"liberty" in support of civil, rather than economic, interests. In a 1923
case, Meyer v. Nebraska,3 0 a state statute forbidding the teaching of
foreign languages in public schools was invalidated under the due
process clause after the Court found that this exercise of legislative
power interfered with the "opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of
their own."'3 The Court expansively defined due process "liberty" as:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and
bring up children, to worship God according to one's dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.3

Subsequently, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,3

3

a state statute

25. See generally cases cited in note 23 supra.
26. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
27. See generally Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Caroline Prods.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937); West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
28. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
29. Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423, 425 (1952).
30. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
31. Id. at 401.

32. Id. at 399.
33.

268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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compelling attendance of children at non-religious public schools was
set aside for the same reason. Significantly, in neither of these cases
did the Court mention that the fundamental interests given substantive
due process protection had any necessary relation to the express terms
of the Bill of Rights. Thus, the Court identified the fundamentality of
the civil rights which were derived from nonconstitutional sources
without the aid of any objective standard; however, no subsequent
decisions have utilized this approach.
III.

A

RIGHT OF PRIVACY EMERGES AND EVOLVES

A.

Introduction

Although the right of privacy is not mentioned specifically in the
Constitution, it has been said that a "right to be let alone is the
underlying theme of the Bill of Rights."3 4 The development, or perhaps
nondevelopment, of a privacy interest into a privacy right is illustrative
of the critical role that methodology plays in the judicial recognition
of nonconstitutional interests as fundamental to due process "liberty."
B.

Historical Origins

1. Constitutional Law.-Three basic concepts account for the
implicit presence of privacy within the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments:3 - individualism, limited government, and the
importance of private property as it relates to the exercise of individual
liberty.36 These political assumptions, which combine to maximize the
concept of privacy within our political system, were injected into that
system to delimit governmental authority in the seizure of persons and
property.
In 1765, an English Court invalidated the use of "writs of
assistance" to search private homes basing its holding on the law of
trespass.3 7 Thereafter, for nearly 100 years after the adoption of our
Constitution, no American court expressly recognized a right of
privacy by decision, although several common law doctrines, among
38
them nuisance and trespass, protected certain aspects of privacy.
34. Griswold, The Right to be let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960).

35. T. COOLEY,
36. A. WESTIN,

A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 330 (1967).

367-75 (2d ed. 1871).

37. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
38. Other common law protections of privacy interests were: eavesdropping prosecutions;
the doctrines of relevance and necessity; protection of trademark; development of legal protection
for confidential relationships; protection of postal privacy. See A. WESTIN, supra note 36, at 333-

37.
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In an 1886 decision, Boyd v. United States,3 the Supreme Court
joined the fourth and fifth amendments to invalidate a provision of the
Federal Customs Act, which compelled production of private effects
when federal agents seized goods suspected to be contraband. Because
the personal effects were not seized physically, their disclosure was not
a traditional fourth amendment search and seizure, and consequently
judicial invalidation of this provision was a protection of a personal
rather than a property right. Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the
Court, intimated that it was the intrusion upon privacy which the
Court was seeking to protect by invoking the fourth and fifth
amendments:
It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers, that

constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property ....40

Thus, it appeared that the fourth, and possibly the fifth, amendment
would become the source for constitutional indentification and
protection of privacy interests.
2. Private Law.-In 1888, Judge Cooley coined the phrase "the
right to be let alone,"'" but prior to that time no court had based relief
expressly on such a right. 2 Most personal interests in privacy were
being protected by doctrines in tort and contract law.13 Several years
later, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, concerned over the
publication of exposes by mass-circulation newspapers, wrote their now
famous seminal essay in which they argued for an independent privacy
principle in the common law.44 After an analysis of the cases, they
concluded that the common law did not adequately protect an
individual's "inviolate personality" and that a man should be able to
seek protection for those interests directly. They argued that without
the new privacy right as a rational basis for protection, the excesses of
"yellow journalism" would continue to expand, since there was no
appropriate legal restraint. 4 The article has since been credited with
39. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
40. Id. at 630.
41. T. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
42. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 829 (3d cd. 1964).
43.
44.

See note 38 supra;A. WESTIN, supra note 36, at 344.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).

45. "The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture,
has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential
to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions of his privacy
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily
injury." Id. at 196.
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inducing recognition of a right of privacy by American courts." In the
nearly 80 years since the article was published, a majority of states
either judicially or legislatively have adopted invasion of privacy as a
tort." Yet during that time and especially during the past decade, there
has been considerable controversy over the definition and present status
of the tort right. Dean Prosser has suggested that the single concept
advocated by Warren and Brandeis has become a conglomeration of
four torts; 48 others have argued that the concept should not be
fragmented, fearing that once the force of a single concept is allowed
to disintegrate, it will again become a derivative interest.,
C. Privacy and The FourthA mendment
Although invasion of privacy has been recognized as a tort in most
states, the Supreme Court has rejected the concept of a broad
constitutional right to privacy within the fourth amendment. In
Olmstead v. United States, 0 the defendant, who had been convicted on
the basis of evidence obtained by a wiretap, relied on the language of
the Boyd decision as support for the propositions that the fourth
amendment protects more than physical invasions of privacy and that
there is a broad constitutional right of privacy within the confines of
the fourth amendment, which can be asserted regardless of the
invasionary method. The majority, speaking through Chief Justice
Taft, observed that constitutional interpretations should conserve
public as well as private interests. To best accomodate those interests,
he upheld the "practical meaning" of the fourth amendment,
construing it "in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search
and seizure when it was adopted." 5 1 Hence, the plain language of the
amendment, "search and seizure," was found to exclude trespass upon
the spoken word and to include only physical trespass.
46. Rogers, A New Erafor Privacy, 43 N.D.L. Rav. 253 (1966).
47. W. PRossER, supra note 42, at 831-32.
48. The 4 torts suggested are: (i) intrusion; (2) public disclosure of private acts; (3) false
light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation. Id. at 83242.
49. "The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others and whose

every need, thought, desire, fancy, or gratification is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived
of his individuality and human dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass. His opinions,
being public, tend never to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be
conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of

unique personal warmth and to become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient,
is fungible; he is not an individual." Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity-An
Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964).
50. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
51. Id. at 465.
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Of the four dissenters, Mr. Justice Brandeis's celebrated opinion
took issue specifically with the Chief Justice's "plain meaning"
interpretive method and with the scope of privacy protection identified
by that method. He contended that above all, constitutional
interpretation should render specific guarantees adaptable to a
changing world: "[A] principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. 5 2 On the issue of
constitutional privacy, Justice Brandeis argued that privacy should be
recognized as an independent interest defined as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
Consequently, he would have accorded it broad and comprehensive
constitutional protection: "[E]very unjustified intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
'53
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Brandeis reasoned that the failure of the majority to distinguish
between the interest protected and the invasionary method had
prevented the identification of privacy as a fundamental fourth
amendment right.
Had the Brandeis theory been adopted by the Court, the fourth
amendment might have become a guaranty of a broad privacy right.
Instead, besides rejecting privacy outright as a fundamental interest,
the Olmstead majority read a requirement of physical trespass into the
fourth amedment. This led to a series of decisions in which the Court
relied diligently on the technical trespass rationale to refuse protection
against ingenious methods of electronic surveillance. 4
Finally, in 1967 the Court held that the physical trespass test
would no longer be controlling. In Katz v. United States,5 5 the
government had obtained incriminating evidence by attaching an
electronic device to the outside of a public telephone booth, which was
being used regularly by the defendant. The Court overturned the
conviction based upon this evidence, holding that although the electronic
eavesdropping equipment did not penetrate the wall of the telephone
booth, the eavesdropping violated defendant's privacy, upon which he
had justifiably relied while using the booth. In distinguishing between
the interest protected and the invasionary method, the Court, speaking
52.

Id. at 473 (dissenting opinion).

53. Id. at 478.
54. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942).

55.

398 U.S. 347 (1967).
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through Mr. Justice Stewart, asserted that the "Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.""6 It might have appeared that with this
apparent emphasis on the civil liberty, rather than the property right
implications of the fourth amendment, the Court was about to
recognize a broad privacy right. But in explicit terms it rejected the
concept of a general constitutional right to privacy embodied within the
fourth amendment that had been envisioned in Boyd and in Justice
Brandeis's Olmstead dissent. Indeed, Justice Stewart agreed that there
were certain privacy interests implicit within the specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights, but in dictum stated that "a person's general right
to privacy . . .is, like the protection of his property and of his very

life, left largely to the law of the individual States." 57
D. Privacy and Due Process "Liberty"
We have seen that the Court has rejected the notion that there is
a broad right of privacy within the fourth amendment or any other
specific guarantee; however, it has been argued by some judges that
certain privacy interests are embodied within due process "liberty" and
should be accorded the status of a constitutional right on the basis of
their fundamentality as derived from nonconstitutional sources.
Mr. Justice Douglas was the first to assert the substance of this
position. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,8 the Court refused
to prohibit the transmission of local radio programs through
loudspeakers installed on streetcars operating within the District of
Columbia. Justice Douglas dissented, contending that "U]iberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom." 59 Because the passengers were a captive
audience and were thereby denied the right to choose not to listen, he
reasoned that the transmission of the programs was a denial of a right
of privacy. Although he chose fifth amendment due process "liberty"
as the embodiment of this privacy right, he was careful to seek out
implicit recognition of privacy in the first, third, and fourth
amendments, identifying in each of them a grant of environmental
control to the individual. Thus, although Justice Douglas would have
broadened the scope of the absolutist method, he still retained the Bill
of Rights as the sole standard for judging, finding constitutional
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.at 351.
Id. at 350-51.
343 U.S. 451 (1952).
Id. at 467.
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support for the fundamentality of privacy in "emanations" from
specific guarantees.
An even more expansive methodology was used by Mr. Justice
Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,6" wherein he argued the
unconstitutionality of a Connecticut contraceptive statute, which was
subsequently struck down in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 In Poe, only
two dissenters, Justices Douglas and Harlan, reached the merits of the2
case, contending that the statute violated the right of privacy.1
Adopting essentially the flexible due process method that was implicit
in prior Cardozo and Frankfurter opinions,6 3 Justice Harlan
maintained that such a method could be used not only to identify the
fundamentality of Bill of Rights guarantees, but also to identify
interests whose fundamentality may be derived from nonconstitutional
.sources. Justice Harlan relied strictly on the due process clause as
embodying this basic privacy interest which emanated from without the
Constitution. Although he pointed to constitutional recognition of
privacy in the third and fourth amendments, he refused to rely on any
of the first eight amendments as a necessary textual foundation for
privacy, arguing that "such an analysis forecloses any claim to
constitutional protection against this form of deprivation of
property." 4
E.

Griswold v. Connecticut

As we have seen, prior to the Griswold decision in 1965, a
majority of the Supreme Court had limited the scope of the privacy
right to the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure. Justices Douglas and Harlan had been the sole advocates
for broadening this scope. Therefore, if privacy was to be the ground
for decision in Griswold, it fell upon the Court to fashion a new
constitutional concept.
Because the Connecticut statute making the use of contraceptives
a criminal offense 5 was clearly uniupportable in light of current social
60. 367 U.S.497 (1961).
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. As he had in Pollak, Justice Douglas found a right of privacy within "emanations"
and "penumbras" of specific Bill of Rights guarantees, 367 U.S. at 509.
63. See notes 8 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
64. 367 U.S. at 549 (dissenting opinion).
65. "Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty
days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned." CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-

32 (1968).
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values, striking it down might have been a simple matter. There were
however, many doctrinal solutions available to the Court, and the
choice among them presented an ideal opportunity to provide future
constitutional underpinnings for privacy and other interests that are not
neatly categorized within the Constitution but which are nevertheless
fundamental to liberty.6
In holding the statute unconstitutional, seven Justices found that
marital privacy was a constitutional right fundamental to due process
"liberty ' 6 7 and declared that the fundamentality of the privacy interest
was not predicated upon any one specific Bill of Rights guarantee. Two
different methodologies were used by the majority in arriving at this
conclusion. Five Justices declared, as had Justice Douglas in Pollak
and Poe, that the fundamentality of marital privacy "emanates" from
the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights;" five Justices held that a privacy
interest can be fundamental to due process "liberty," quite apart from
any of the Bill of Rights specifics.69 Thus, at least five Justices
reaffirmed the seemingly repudiated judicial power to protect
fundamental substantive interests regardless of source. Not since Meyer
and Pierce had a Court majority identified and protected a substantive
civil right not expressly contained within the confines of the first eight
amendments.
Perhaps the great significance of Griswold lies in the Court's vote
against a narrow, literal reading of the Constitution, relying instead
upon the spirit rather than the specifics of "liberty." Privacy is but one
example. The long struggle to grant constitutional recognition to a
privacy interest is illustrative of the potential difficulties in identifying
the fundamentality of other basic values, which spring from sources
apart from the constitutional text. If the Court should refute the clear
implications of Griswold, privacy and other nonconstitutional interests
fundamental to liberty will either go unprotected or remain in large
part derivative interests, fettered by the history and precedents which
exist within each specific constitutional guarantee. Nevertheless, the
methodological implications of Griswold are a step toward insuring the
relevancy of constitutional liberty to the changing demands of society,
thereby preserving the conflict-resolving capacities of constituional law.
66. Among the choices of doctrinal solutions were: the equal protection clause; the due
process clause; and the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments.
67. These Justices were: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Harlan, Goldberg,
White, Brennan, and Clark.
68. These Justices were: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Goldberg, Brennan,
and Clark.
69. These Justices were: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan, White, Goldberg, and

Brennan.
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IV.

FUNDAMENTAL

STANDARDS-

A.

INTERESTS AND

OBJECTIVE

METHODOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS

The Searchfor Objectivity

When faced with the assertion of anew and allegedly fundamental
interest, such as privacy, a court is caught in a frustrating dilemma-to
maintain its authority it must act, yet it must preserve its constitutional
powers by exercising them with restraint. 70 Theoretically, at least, a
judge has the power to reshape society according to his personal
scheme of values and his own beliefs in how interests should be
balanced in giving effect to those values. Accordingly, judges seek to
apply a standard that is sufficiently objective to limit present as well
as future discretion in the adjudication of the asserted interest. This is
especially true when interpreting provisions like the due process clauses,
which change content depending on the nature of the controversy and
the claim asserted, with the result that precedent is often meaningless.
The function of a judicial standard, then, is twofold: it must first-aid
a court in rationally articulating a resolution of the conflict in the
instant controversy, and perhaps more importantly, the decision must
somehow transcend the specific dispute so as to reflect the resolution
that society at large will accept. In this role, a court is a necessary
power organ of a larger social process by which the conflicts of society
are resolved and its goals articulated.7 '
When an interest is asserted as fundamental to due process
"liberty," if a judge is not satisfied that a precise standard exists by
which he can identify, formulate, and apply the interest, he might deny
outright the very existence of the interest. As we have seen, this has
been the result of countless efforts to convince the Supreme Court of
the fundamentality of an interest for which there is no express
constitutional foundation. In its search for objectivity, the Court
generally has limited the choice of standards to the Bill of Rights,
thereby limiting basic human rights to those envisioned nearly 200
years ago. There are a number of reasons why concerns for objectivity
should not present a threshold bar to consideration of the merits of a
claim, so long as it is not plainly frivolous.
First, historical justifications no longer exist to support such
70. There are no absolute limitations in the Constitution, which can have a practical effect
upon the Court's power, short of impeachment or amendment. Further, phrases such as "case
or controversy," "standing to sue," and "political question" can be easily manipulated.
71. See Ribble, A Look at Policy Making Powersof the United States Supreme Court and
the Position of the Individual, 14 WASH. & LE L. REv. 167 (1957); Rostow, The Supreme Court
and the People's Will, 33 NoTRE DAME LAW. 573 (1958).
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limitations upon human rights. Libertarians have long argued that the
use of a flexible standard inherent within an "ordered liberty" method
would eventually "dilute" the Bill of Rights by denying the
fundamentality of those specific guarantees. Most of the major
provisions of the Bill of Rights, however, have been incorporated
without dilution into due process "liberty. 72 Secondly, it can be
argued that total objectivity is unattainable due to the subjective
elements present in any methodology adopted for constitutional
adjudication.13 The issues before the Court contain very real political,
economic, and social implications, which are both persuasive. and
essential to a decision if it is to reflect the built-in organic aspects of
our constitutional system. 74 Thirdly, the Court's constitutional duty is
to resolve conflicts and thereby to preserve the flexibility and
receptiveness of law in the face of forces for change. In light of our
evolving society, it is wholly unrealistic to claim that an individual's
repository of basic constitutional rights is limited to the text of the Bill
of Rights. Such a position succeeds only in establishing an irrebuttable
presumption of constitutionality for that legislation which is not
repugnant to constitutional specifics, in spite of the legitimate human
needs that must suffer. Lastly, the basic question should not center on
whether personal judgment will be used; the real issue concerns the
wisdom with which the Court will exercise its legitimate, if personal,
powers. Mr. Justice Cardozo has appropriately commented on judicial
wisdom as follows:
[L]ogic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of
right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress
of the law. . . . One of the most fundamental social interests is that law should
be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of
prejudice or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness.'

The issue of wisdom necessarily involves the issue of appropriate
judicial method.
B. Flexible v. Absolute Methodologies
It has been suggested that the quest for objectivity is in itself futile
that
it acts as an effective denial of the independent existence of
and
72. See note 22supraand accompanying text.
73. See Braden, The Searchfor Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE SUPREME COURT 172 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
74. Although it is said that the Supreme Court does not "interpret" facts, in reality facts
seldom speak for themselves, existing only as they are contemplated by their recipient. See A. N.
WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT 13 (1938); Cahn, Fact-Skepticism and Fundamental Law, 33
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1958).
75. B. CARDOZO, THE

NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

112 (1921).
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fundamental nonconstitutional interests. It is submitted that a flexible
due process, ordered liberty method can provide whatever objective
standards are possible and necessary in constitutional adjudication.
Every constitutional question is replete with competing values,
which reflect differing values within society. It has been the basic thesis
of this Note that there never has been, and never can be, a selfexecuting, objective formula for interpreting the Constitution.
Changing needs and demands of society will produce new challenges to
individual liberties. For example, as fierce domestic controversies
continue to build, public pressure will likewise build to restrict
constitutional "liberty." The use of physical violence against the
people, property, and institutions of the United States in apparent
defiance of the law have created recently a climate of fear within the
country which could lead many people to choose "order" at the
expense of the "liberty" of others, as well as their own. The
constitutional issues that come before the Court are, therefore, not so
much a clash between right and wrong as a conflict between right and
right. The absolutist method often avoids these genuine dilemmas by
its effort to fashion "responsible" judicial processes, thereby slighting
the emphasis that should also be given the "responsiveness" of the law.
A flexible method offers an opportunity to confront the right-right
dilemma by seeking the fundamentality of asserted private interests and
weighing them against public interests. This method brings all relevant
and recalcitrant facts to bear upon the identification process by which
an interest's fundamentality is demonstrated.
The extent to which fundamental interests are found to exist will
depend upon how such interests are conceived. Since definition really
has meaning only in light of the purpose for which the definition is
sought, perhaps the best that can be expected is to impart to the Court
some sense of the interest's fundamentality to individual liberty in a
complex society. This much is essential, for taking privacy as an
example, much of the reluctance of the Court to identify the privacy
interest can be traced to its failure to perceive the realistic implications
of the privacy interest to modern man. 7 The one common element in
definitions of privacy is control: privacy enables an individual to
control what is known about himself and about his sphere of human
activity. 77 Privacy need not find support derivatively from some existent
constitutional value; rather, the fact that a person needs a reasonable
measure of control over his life space would seem a sufficient selfjustification for the interest's fundamentality and independent existence
within the constitutional framework.
76. See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text.
77. See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
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Continuing with privacy as an illustration, there are many

convincing justifications that can be brought to bear on the proposition
that aspects of privacy are fundamental to liberty. Among them,
perhaps the best documented are studies reflecting the anthropological,

sociological, philosophical, psychological, and political implications of
privacy.7 8 This body of scientifically developed knowledge about

privacy would seem relevant and essential to the resolution of the
ultimate issue of fundamentality. The nonlegal disciplines can aid the

judicial process in directing the law, involving that process in the larger
social process of which it is obviously a part.
Such extra-legal data obviously does not provide legal conclusions,
but it does disclose information which lends credence to the conclusions
of a wholly legal argument. 7 This data reflects the social implications

of legal values and consequently provides an objective context to guide
the Court in seeking the peculiar fundamentality of an asserted interest.
This "forced" involvement in the larger social process is the potential
objectivity inherent in "ordered liberty"; Justices are forced to make
legal decisions against the fabric of social facts and implications.
Labels and patent formulas, characteristic of the absolutist method, are
not present under the guise of "objectivity" to exonerate the individual

Justices from their responsibility of consciously adjusting the universal
to the local, yet retaining sufficient universality to assure social

acceptance of the decision and the utility of the accommodation of
interests.
JAMES HOWARD WILDMAN

78. The anthropological studies include: R. ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966);
HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966); Murphy, Social Distance and the Veil, 66 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1257-74 (1964). The philosophical studies include: J. BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED (C. Everett ed. 1945); J.S. MILL, ESSAY ON LIBERTY (1859); Rawls,
E.

Legal Obligation and the Study of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
The psychological studies include: E. COFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY
LIFE (1959); E. HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER (1951); R. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF (1960); A.
MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954); Journard, Some Psychological Aspects of

Privacy,31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 307 (1966).
The sociological studies include: D. KRECH, THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY (1962); LEWIS,
RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICT (1943); R. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION (1960); Bates, Privacy-A Useful Concept?, 42 SOCIAL FORCES 429 (1964);
Shils, Privacy: Its Constitutionand Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 281 (1966).
The political science studies include: H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1959); M.
BERGER, FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN MODERN SOCIETY (1964); H. ROELOFS, THE TENSION OF
CmZTENSHIP: PRIVATE MAN AND PUBLIC DUTY (1957); Berle, The Protectionof Privacy, 79 POL.
SCL Q. 162 (1964).
79. "Some of the errors of courts have their origin in imperfect knowledge of the economic
and social consequences of a decision, or of the economic and social needs to which a decision
will respond. In the complexities of modern life there is a constantly increasing need for resort
by the judges to some fact-finding agency which will substitute exact knowledge of factual
conditions for conjecture and impression." B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 116-17
(1924).

